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RECENT DECISIONS

as wire-tapping has long been regarded as a reprehensible practice, 17
the principle, in this case, seems to have been justly applied.' 8
A.W.

HUSBAND

AND

WIFE-TRUSTS-DOWER-DECEDENT

ESTATE

LAW SECTION 18 CONSTRUED.-Ferdinand Straus, three days prior

to his death on July 1, 1934, after making his last will, executed a
trust agreement wherein he transferred to trustees all his real and
personal property, reserving the income for life, right to revoke the
trust at will, and full control of the trustees. Upon his death, the
property was to pass to one other than his wife.' The widow has
challenged the validity of the transfer to the trustees. Held, the husband's conveyance to the trustees, reserving the income, power of
revocation and right to control the trustees was illusory and void as
to the rights of the surviving spouse under the Decedent Estate Law
Sections 18 and 83.2 Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d)
966 (1937).
Prior to September 1, 1930, a wife was endowed of a life estate
in one-third of the real property of which her deceased husband was
beneficially seized during coverture. 3 While the husband was still
alive, dower was an inchoate right, a mere contingent claim and not
an estate in land, 4 yet, it was a subsisting interest which was fully

"See N. Y. Times, Edit., Sept. 4, 1931, p. 18, col. 3; id. Dec. 3, 1932, p.
36, col. 6; id. Edit., Jan. 30, 1933, p. 2, col. 4.
"As to effect upon intrastate communications, see Edit., N. Y. L. J.,
Dec. 29, 1937.
'The deceased could not have effectively cut off his wife by a testamentary
disposition, nor by dying intestate seized of the property in question. If the
agreement effectively divested the settlor of title, then the decedent left no estate
and the widow receives nothing.
IN. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 18. "Where a testator dies after August 31, 1930,
and leaves a will thereafter executed and leaves surviving a husband or wife, a
personal right of election is given to the surviving spouse to take his or her
share of the estate as in intestacy, subject to the limitations, conditions and
exceptions contained in this section. ** *." See also DECEDENT ESTATE LAW

§§82, 83.
'N. Y.

REAL PROP. LAw § 190. "When the parties intermarried prior to
the first day of September, 1930, a widow shall be endowed of the third part
of all lands whereof her husband was prior to the first day of September, 1930,
seized of an estate of inheritance, at any time during the marriage. Except as
hereinbefore provided, after the 31st day of August, 1930, no inchoate right of
dower shall be possessed by a wife during coverture, and no widow shall be
endowed in any lands whereof her husband became seized of an estate of
inheritance."
'Witthaus v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 332, 11 N. E. 649 (1887); Moore v. City
of N. Y., 8 N. Y. 110 (1853).
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protected, 5 and any attempt to deprive a married woman of her dower
through fraudulent means would fail.6 In a conveyance of realty by
a husband, joinder by his wife in the deed was necessary in order to
effect a release of her inchoate right of dower in the property conveyed. 7 The need for such joinder made land transactions wherein
the husband was the expectant grantor, burdensome in that an additional party had to be consulted; and perilous in that the covert possibility existed that a widow might claim dower in lands otherwise
believed free from any entanglements.8
The legislature in 1929, motivated partly by the desire to facilitate the alienation of realty, enacted statutes wherein dower was, to
an extent, abolished 9 and in lieu thereof, Section 18 of the Decedent
Estate Law and other statutes relating to a decedent's estate were
passed, effective on September 1, 1930.10 Will the courts extend the
same measure of protection to this new statutory expectancy as was
formerly granted to inchoate dower? In attempting to answer this
question we must bear in mind the reasons why dower was abolished
and what motivated the legislature in adding these new sections to
the Decedent Estate Law. Various factors must be considered if
we are to arrive at an intelligent conclusion, as for example, free alienation of property, the abolition of the distinction formerly existing between real and personal property, the equal status attained by a husband and wife today, and the fact that the Decedent Estate Law applies only to property of which a spouse dies seized. While a husband is still alive, the wife has no interest in his property. The difficulty arises when we lose sight of these facts. Has a right similar
to dower been granted to a wife under the Decedent Estate Law or
is this new expectancy subject to different considerations than those
which applied to dower?
By statute," it was intended to give to a surviving spouse an
increased share o.f the estate the spouse died seized of,1 2 either in case
of intestacy or by an election against the terms of a will left by the
'In re Cropsey Ave., 268 N. Y. 183, 197 N. E. 189 (1935); Matter of
Brooklyn Bridge, 143 N. Y. 640, 39 N. E. 823 (1893).
'Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N. Y. 211, 153 N. E. 51 (1926) ; Clifford v. Kampfe,
147 N. Y. 383, 42 N. E. 1 (1895) ; Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298 (1873);
Young v. Carter, 10 Hun 194 (N. Y. 1877).
'Whitthaus v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 332, 11 N. E. 649 (1887) ; Hinchliffe v.
Shea, 103 N. Y. 153, 8 N. E. 477 (1886); Elmendorf v. Lockwood, 57 N. Y.
322 (1874).
REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1934) 185; Clifford v. Kampfe, 147 N.
'WALSH,
Y. 383, 42 N. E. 1 (1895) ; McIntyre v. Costello, 47 Hun 289 (N. Y. 1888).
o See note 2, .tpra.
"N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW §§ 18, 83.
"Ibid.
N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW § 18; In re Blumenstiel's Will, 248 App. Div. 533,
290 N. Y. Supp. 935 (4th Dept. 1936); Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119,
286 N. Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dept. 1936); In re Collins' Estate, 156 Misc. 783,
282 N. Y. SuOp. 728 (1935) ; In re Harris' Estate, 150 Misc. 758, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 464 (1934).
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deceased spouse, subject to certain conditions, limitations and exceptions found in the statute. Thus, under the statute, the utmost freedom of control of property with the ability to transfer the same at
will, has been achieved.13 While in a few states with similar statutes,
the disposition of property with the intent to prevent the rights of a
surviving spouse from accruing will not be successful,'14 yet, the majority view gives no such weight to the intent, the transfer not depending upon the motive for its validity. 15 However, an illusory
conveyance will not defeat the expectant interest of the wife under
the statute. One may not in form convey while in substance retain
control, enjoyment and other powers closely associated with ownership.' 0 Though a person may use means lawfully available to keep
outside the scope of a statute, a false appearance of legality, however
attained, will not avail him. 17 The test to be applied is not the intent
but the question of whether the disposition was real or illusory.' 8
Herein the court has properly found that the alleged conveyance

Herrmann v. Jorgenson, 263 N. Y. 348, 189 N. E. 449 (1934); In re
Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 284 N. Y. Supp. 28 (1935) ; Pringle v. Pringle,
59 Pa. 281 (1868).
,Payne, v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S. W. (2d) 2 (1930) ; Patch v. Squires,
105 Vt. 405, 165 Atl. 919 (1933) ; Dunnett v. Shields, 97 Vt. 419, 123 At!. 626
(1934).
564 A. L. R. 487 (1930) (Gifts inter-vivos, husband and wife) ; 1 SIMEs,
FUTRE INTERESTS (1936) 238-239; instant case; Samson v. Samson, 67 Iowa
253, 25 N. W. 233 (1885); Sturgis v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137
At!. 378 (1927); Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N. E. 1068 (1902).
" Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 287- N. Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dept. 1936);
Rubin v. Myrub Realty Co., 244 App. Div. 541, 279 N. Y. Supp. 867 (1st
Dept. 1935) ; Brownell v. Briggs, 173 Mass. 529, 54 N. E. 251 (1899).
"Jenkins v. Moyse 254 N. Y. 319, 172 N. E. 521 (1930).
"Instant case; Holmes v. Holmes, 3 Paige 363 (N. Y. 1832) ; Leonard v.
Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N. E. 1068 (1902). It must be noted that all the
cases to date, on this issue, have been those in which some measure of control
of the property has been retained by the grantor. A case wherein an actual
disposition has been effected, no benefits retained, with the intent to leave no
property upon death, so that the widow would not have the benefit of the
Decedent Estate Law, has not as yet been submitted to judicial interpretation.
Fortunately, the court in the instant case has laid down the test by which the
validity of a conveyance by a married person may be established. It has done
much to weaken, if not to vitiate, the effect of the dicta in the case of Bodner
v. Feit, wherein the court placed the grantor's hidden motive in making the
conveyance, upon a high and governing plane. Undoubtedly, if the test laid
down in the instant case is applied to future cases in point, the intent of the
person conveying will be held to be immaterial, where an actual disposition of
the property, with no strings attached, has been made. Thus, free alienation of
property, real and personal, will have been attained, as was intended by
the legislature. As so ably stated by Judge Henderson in the Matter of
Schurer, "A presumption might arise that a man does not intend to leave his
wife a public charge. Such a presumption, though beneficial to a surviving
spouse, would be so prejudicial to the doctrine of free alienation of property
that the courts might hesitate to correct legislative mistakes by judicial interpretation. The solution of the problem lies with the legislature."
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to the trustees was illusory and thus ineffective to prevent the rights
from accruing under the recently enacted statute. 19
L.I.

THE

INJUNCTION-LABOR UNION-PICKETING-SECTION 876-a OF
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT.-W. and I. Blumenthal employed non-

union labor in manufacturing meat products which they sold to retailers under the name "Ukor". In an effort to induce the manufacturers to hire union workmen, the defendant Butcher Union Local
174 picketed the shops of those retailers, among them the plaintiff,
who dealt in this non-union product. The pickets bore placards
making public the nature of the dispute and requesting customers to
buy union-made delicatessen only. The plaintiff was denied an injunction at Special Term on the ground that a situation governed by
Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act, which prohibits issuance of
preliminary injunctions in labor disputes, was involved. The Appellate Division reversed both on the law and the facts. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, held, injunction denied.' Picketing may be
carried on in a proper and peaceful manner, not only against the
manufacturer but against a non-union product sold by one in unity of
interest with the manufacturer who is in the same business for profit.
Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937).
Picketing is not violative of either the Federal 2 or the New
York State 3 Constitutions. Although it is illegal to use violence and
intimidation incidentally to picketing, 4 any injury resulting from
peaceful picketing in conjunction with a labor dispute is damnum
absque injuria.5 The use of temporary injunctions against picketing
had become such a formidable employers' weapon to combat unions
that Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act was enacted to eliminate
" N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAW § 18.
'The Court of Appeals and Special Term were in disagreement concerning
the reliability of evidence offered by the plaintiff in proof of illegal coercive
conduct by the defendant for which an injunction might be issued lawfully.
No one "has a constitutional right to a remedy against the lawful acts of
another." Senn v. Tile Layers' Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468. 57 Sun. Ct.
857 (1936); Levering and Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (1934).
3J. H. & S. Thea., Inc. v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932);
Aberdeen Restaurant Corp. v. Gottfried, 158 IVisc. 785, 285 N. Y. Supp. 832
(1935); (1937) 35 MicH. L. REv. 1320.
'Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921) ; Stuhmer and
Co. v. Korman, 265 N. Y. 481, 192 N. E. 281 (1934); Nann v. Raimist, 255
N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931); Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N Y.
1, 124 N. E. 87 (1919) ; Remington Rand, 248 App. Div. 356. 289 N. Y. Supp
1025 (4th Dept. 1932).
'Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N.
E. 130 (1927).

